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Abstract
We study the problem of computing correlated
strategies to commit to in games with multiple lead-
ers and followers. To the best of our knowledge,
this problem is widely unexplored so far, as the
majority of the works in the literature focus on
games with a single leader and one or more fol-
lowers. The fundamental ingredient of our model
is that a leader can decide whether to participate in
the commitment or to defect from it by taking on
the role of follower. This introduces a preliminary
stage where, before the underlying game is played,
the leaders make their decisions to reach an agree-
ment on the correlated strategy to commit to. We
distinguish three solution concepts on the basis of
the constraints that they enforce on the agreement
reached by the leaders. Then, we provide a com-
prehensive study of the properties of our solution
concepts, in terms of existence, relation with other
solution concepts, and computational complexity.
1 Introduction
Over the last years, Stackelberg games are receiving an in-
creasing attention from the algorithmic game theory commu-
nity, thanks to their many applications in real-world scenar-
ios, such as in security [Tambe, 2011]. In the classical Stack-
elberg setting [Von Stackelberg, 1934], there is a leader with
the ability to play before the other player, who acts as fol-
lower by observing the realization of the leader’s strategy. In
this work, we follow a different approach, where the leader
looks for a strategy to commit to [Conitzer and Sandholm,
2006], and the follower observes the leader’s mixed strategy,
without knowing its actual realization. An interpretation of
this setting is provided by Von Stengel and Zamir [2010]:
any (underlying) game is extended as a sequential game in
which the leader plays first, having a continuum of choices
corresponding to mixed-strategy commitments.
The majority of the works in the literature focus on games
with a single leader and a single follower [Conitzer and Sand-
holm, 2006; Von Stengel and Zamir, 2010]. In this set-
ting, the leader seeks for a utility-maximizing mixed strat-
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egy to commit to, while the follower plays a best response
to the commitment. This model has been largely studied,
especially for security applications [Paruchuri et al., 2008;
Kiekintveld et al., 2009; An et al., 2011].
Some works also study games with a single leader and
multiple followers. Conitzer and Korzhyk [2011] introduce a
model where the leader commits to a correlated strategy and,
accordingly, she draws recommendations for the followers,
who must obey the incentive constraints of correlated equilib-
ria [Aumann, 1974]. The authors show that, in normal-form
games, an optimal correlated strategy to commit to can be
computed in polynomial time. Other works study situations
where the followers play a Nash equilibrium [Nash, 1951] in
the game resulting from the leader’s mixed-strategy commit-
ment [Von Stengel and Zamir, 2010; Coniglio et al., 2017;
Coniglio et al., 2018; De Nittis et al., 2018; Marchesi et al.,
2018; Marchesi et al., 2019]. However, these models usually
result in intractable computational problems even with a fixed
number of followers.
Settings including multiple leaders are widely unexplored
in the literature. In spite of this, many real-world applica-
tions naturally involve more than one player with competi-
tive advantages, playing the role of leader. Some scenarios
are, e.g., network platforms with premium (prioritized) users,
markets where a group of firms forms a price-determining
dominant cartel, and political elections in which some candi-
dates choose policy positions in advance of challengers.
Restricted to the security context, there are some works
addressing games with multiple uncoordinated defenders
(leaders) [Smith et al., 2014; Lou and Vorobeychik, 2015;
Laszka et al., 2016; Lou et al., 2017; Gan et al., 2018]. How-
ever, differently from our work, they all enforce Nash-like
constraints on the leaders’ strategies. Moreover, their models
suffer from two major drawbacks: (i) an exact equilibrium
may not exist, and (ii) they strongly rely on problem-specific
structures arising in security problems.
The operations research literature provides further works
on multi-leader-follower settings, under the name of math-
ematical programs with equilibrium constraints [Luo et al.,
1996]. They assume that both leaders and followers are sub-
ject to Nash constraints, with the latter playing in the game
resulting from the leaders’ strategies [Leyffer and Munson,
2010; Kulkarni and Shanbhag, 2014]. Furthermore, other
works from the same field focus on oligopoly models where
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the leaders select the level of investment to maximize prof-
its [DeMiguel and Xu, 2009]. All these works considerably
depart from ours, as they use fundamentally different models
and lack thorough game theoretic and computational studies.
Original Contributions
We introduce a new way to apply the Stackelberg paradigm
to any finite (underlying) game. Our approach extends the
idea of commitment to correlated strategies in settings in-
volving multiple leaders and followers, generalizing the work
of Conitzer and Korzhyk [2011]. The crucial component of
our framework is that a leader can decide whether to partic-
ipate in the commitment or to defect from it by becoming
a follower. This induces a preliminary agreement stage that
takes place before the underlying game is played, where the
leaders decide, in turn, whether to opt out from the com-
mitment or not. We model this stage as a sequential game,
whose size is factorial in the number of players. Our goal is
to identify commitments guaranteeing some desirable prop-
erties that we define on the agreement stage. The first one
requires that the leaders do not have any incentive to become
followers. It comes in two flavors, called stability and perfect
stability, which are related to, respectively, Nash and sub-
game perfect equilibria of the sequential game representing
the agreement stage. The second property is also defined in
two flavors, namely efficiency and perfect efficiency, both en-
forcing Pareto optimality with respect to the leaders’ utility
functions, though at different levels of the agreement stage.
We introduce three solution concepts, which we generally
call Stackelberg correlated equilibria (SCEs). They differ de-
pending on the properties they call for. Specifically, SCEs,
SCEs with perfect agreement (SCE-PAs), and SCE-PAs with
perfect efficiency (SCE-PAPEs) require, respectively, stabil-
ity and efficiency, perfect stability and efficiency, and both
perfect stability and perfect efficiency.
First, we investigate the game theoretic properties of our
solution concepts. We show that SCEs and SCE-PAs are
guaranteed to exist in any game, while SCE-PAPEs may not.
Moreover, we compare them with other solution concepts.
Then, we switch the attention to the computational com-
plexity perspective. We show that, provided a suitably de-
fined stability oracle is solvable in polynomial time, an SCE
optimizing some linear function of leaders’ utilities (such as
the leaders’ social welfare) can be computed in polynomial
time, even in the number of players. The same holds for find-
ing an SCE-PA, while we prove that computing an optimal
SCE-PA is an intractable problem. Nevertheless, in the lat-
ter case, we provide an (exponential in the game size) upper
bound on the necessary number of queries to the oracle.
In conclusion, we study which classes of games admit a
polynomial-time stability oracle, focusing on those with poly-
nomial type [Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008]. We
show that the problem solved by our oracle is strictly con-
nected with the weighted deviation-adjusted social welfare
problem introduced by Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2011]. As
a result, we get that our oracle is solvable in polynomial time
in all the game classes where the same holds for the problem
of finding an optimal correlated equilibrium. 1
1Full proofs of all the results are in Appendices B, C, D, and E.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some basic concepts about
games and their equilibria used in the rest of the paper.
2.1 Finite Games and Their Equilibria
A (finite) game G is a tuple (N, {Sp}p∈N , {up}p∈N ), where
N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players, Sp is a finite set of
player p’s strategies or actions, and up : S → R is player p’s
utility, defined over the set of strategy profiles S =×p∈N Sp.
Given s ∈ S, let s−p ∈ S−p =×q∈N\{p} Sq be the partial
profile obtained by dropping player p’s strategy sp from s,
so that s = (sp, s−p). We call X = ∆(S) the set of cor-
related distributions defined over strategy profiles, i.e., each
x ∈ X satisfies ∑s∈S x(s) = 1 and x(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S.
Moreover, overloading notation, up(x) =
∑
s∈S x(s)up(s)
is player p’s expected utility in x ∈ X .
A correlated distribution x ∈ X is a correlated equilib-
rium (CE) [Aumann, 1974] if, for every player p ∈ N and
strategies sp 6= s′p ∈ Sp, the following constraint holds:∑
s−p∈S−p
x(sp, s−p)
(
up(sp, s−p)− up(s′p, s−p)
) ≥ 0. (1)
We can interpret a CE in terms of a mediator who draws some
strategy profile s ∈ S from a publicly known distribution x,
and, then, it privately communicates each recommendation sp
to player p. The distribution is an equilibrium if no player has
an incentive to deviate from the recommendation, as made
formal by the incentive constraints of Eq. (1). Moreover, a
Nash equilibrium (NE) [Nash, 1951] is a CE x ∈ X that
can be written as the product distribution of players’ mixed
strategies, i.e., x(s) =
∏
p∈N xp(sp) for all s ∈ S, where
each xp ∈ ∆(Sp) is a probability distribution over strategies
Sp denoting a player p’s mixed strategy.
In the following, we denote with X CEP ⊆ X the set of
correlated distributions that satisfy the incentive constraints
of Eq. (1) only for a subset of players P ⊆ N . Clearly,
X CE = X CEN is the set of CEs of the game.
Different classes of games are employed depending on how
strategies and utilities are represented. The most common
representation is the normal form, which encodes each utility
function up as an n-dimensional matrix indexed by s ∈ S.
Thus, the size of a normal-form game is exponential in the
number of players. Many other representations have been
introduced in the literature. In Section 7, we are interested
in those with polynomial type [Papadimitriou and Roughgar-
den, 2008], where the number of players and the number of
strategies are bounded by polynomials in the size of the game.
Many important classes of games admit a polynomial-type
representation, such as graphical games [Kearns et al., 2013],
polymatrix games [Eaves, 1973], anonymous games [Blon-
ski, 2000], and congestion games [Rosenthal, 1973].
2.2 Stackelberg Games and Equilibria
Any finite game has a Stackelberg counterpart where some
of the players are leaders and the others are followers. The
former have the ability to commit to a course of play before-
hand, while the latter decide how to play after observing the
commitment [Von Stengel and Zamir, 2010].
Definition 1. Given a finite game G, a Stackelberg game
(SG) is a tuple (G,L, F ) where L and F are the sets of lead-
ers and followers, respectively, with N = L ∪ F .
In single-leader single-follower SGs, the follower best re-
sponds to the leader’s mixed-strategy commitment [Conitzer
and Sandholm, 2006; Von Stengel and Zamir, 2010].
Definition 2. Given an SG (G, {1}, {2}), a leader’s mixed
strategy x1 ∈ ∆(S1) defines a Stackelberg equilibrium (SE)
if it maximizes u1 given that, for each x′1 ∈ ∆(S1), the fol-
lower plays an x2(x′1) ∈ ∆(S2) maximizing u2. 2
The multi-follower case unfolds in different scenarios de-
pending on how the followers are assumed to play. Conitzer
and Korzhyk [2011] study what they call optimal correlated
strategies to commit to, where the leader commits to a utility-
maximizing correlated distribution satisfying the incentive
constraints (Eq. (1)) for the followers only. Formally:
Definition 3. Given an SG (G, {1}, N \ {1}), x ∈ X is an
optimal correlated strategy to commit to if it maximizes the
leader’s utility u1(x) over the set X CEN\{1}.
In our work, we pursue the approach of Conitzer and Ko-
rzhyk [2011], rather than letting the followers play an NE,
as done, e.g., by Von Stengel and Zamir [2010]. Indeed,
while the two models provide the same leader’s utility in
single-follower SGs (corresponding to that in an SE), the lat-
ter may be strictly better in SGs with two or more followers
(see [Conitzer and Korzhyk, 2011] for an example).
3 Multi-Leader-Follower Stackelberg Games
We address SGs with multiple leaders and followers. The
key components of our approach are the following. First, we
allow the leaders to decide whether to participate in the com-
mitment or to defect from it by taking on the role of followers.
This is modeled by the agreement stage of the SG, whose
result is the formation of an agreement involving a subset
of the leaders. Second, in the spirit of CEs, we introduce
a correlation device that, after the agreement, draws recom-
mendations and privately communicates them to the players.
Following Conitzer and Korzhyk [2011], we assume that the
leaders involved in the agreement commit to play their rec-
ommendations, while the followers obey to the usual incen-
tive constraints of CEs (see Eq. (1)). The correlation device
may adopt different distributions depending on the sequence
of defections that determined the agreement, and these distri-
butions are publicly known. Our goal is to design the device,
so as to achieve some desirable properties of the commitment,
which we formally describe in the rest of the section.
Before going into our main definitions, we introduce some
useful notation. Given a subset of players P ⊆ N , we denote
with ΠP the collection of ordered subsets of P , including the
empty set ∅. Given pi ∈ ΠP and p ∈ P \ pi, we let pip be
the ordered set obtained by appending p at the end of pi. We
use x = [xpi] to denote a vector of correlated distributions
2In the literature, different SE concepts are defined depending on
how the follower is assumed to break ties. The strong and weak SEs
are two notable cases [Breton et al., 1988], where the follower is
assumed to break ties in favor and against the leader, respectively.
xpi ∈ X CEpi∪F , one per ordered subset of leaders pi ∈ ΠL, while
X =×pi∈ΠL X CEpi∪F is the set of all such vectors. In words,
pi ∈ ΠL represents a sequence of leaders’ defections in the
agreement stage, while x defines the publicly known corre-
lated distributions adopted by the correlation device, with xpi
being the one used when the sequence of defections is pi.
Definition 4. Given a vector of distributions x = [xpi] ∈ X,
an SG (G,L, F ) is structured in the following two stages:
• Agreement. It goes on in rounds. In a given round, each
leader, in turn, decides between OPT-IN and OPT-OUT.3
All the decisions are perfectly observable. If a player
chooses OPT-OUT, then she leaves the set of leaders be-
coming a follower, and a new round starts. The stage
ends when, during a round, all remaining leaders de-
cide to OPT-IN. The result is the ordered subset pi ∈ ΠL
of leaders who decided to OPT-OUT. 4 5
• Play. The correlation device draws some s ∈ S ac-
cording to the publicly known correlated distribution xpi .
Then, each player is privately told her recommendation
and the underlying game G is played, with the leaders
in L \ pi sticking to their recommendations.
Remark 1. The agreement stage of an SG can be represented
as a sequential (i.e., tree-form) game involving the leaders.
In such game, the players play in turn, according to some
fixed order, with only two actions available at each decision
point: OPT-IN and OPT-OUT. When a player chooses OPT-
OUT, then she never plays anymore. The game ends after
a sequence of OPT-IN actions performed by all leaders who
have not selected OPT-OUT yet. Thus, each leaf of the game
corresponds to the ordered subset pi ∈ ΠL representing the
sequence of leaders who performed OPT-OUT on the path
to the leaf. Players’ payoffs are defined by up(xpi) for p ∈
L. See Figure 1 (Right) for an example of sequential-game-
representation of the agreement stage.
Next, we introduce some desirable properties that the dis-
tributions of the correlation device should satisfy. In the fol-
lowing definitions, we assume that an SG (G,L, F ) is given.
First, we introduce stability. In words, we require that the
leaders in L do not have any incentive to become followers.
We introduce two different notions of stability, as follows.
Definition 5. Given x = [xpi] ∈ X, for any pi ∈ ΠL, xpi is
stable if, for every p ∈ L \ pi, up(xpi) ≥ up(xpip). Moreover:
• x is stable if x∅ is stable;
• x is perfectly stable if xpi is stable for every pi ∈ ΠL.
We denote with XS ⊆ X and XPS ⊆ X the sets of stable
and perfectly stable distributions, respectively.
Remark 2. The rationale behind stability is that of NE. In-
deed, x ∈ X is stable if and only if each leader playing OPT-
IN is an NE of the sequential game representing the agree-
ment stage. Intuitively, this is because, if x ∈ X is stable,
3We assume that the leaders are asked to take a decision accord-
ing to some ordering, e.g., p ∈ L decides before q ∈ L if p < q.
4The agreement stage is finite as there are at most |L| rounds and
each round involves at most |L| decisions.
5Our results do not rely on the protocol implemented in the
agreement stage. Others could be adopted, with the only require-
ment that they must record in which order the leaders do OPT-OUT.
each leader must not have any incentive to play OPT-OUT
given that the other leaders always play OPT-IN.
Remark 3. The rationale behind perfect stability is that of
subgame perfection. Indeed, x ∈ X is perfectly stable if
and only if each leader playing OPT-IN is a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the agreement stage. The reason is that per-
fect stability requires that playing OPT-IN is optimal at any
decision point of the sequential game.
The second property that we look for is efficiency. We re-
quire that the correlated distributions of the correlation device
are Pareto optimal with respect to the utility functions of the
leaders who decided to OPT-IN. Given X′ ⊆ X, for pi ∈ ΠL,
we use PL\pi(X′) to denote the set of Pareto optimal corre-
lated distributions in the set {x′pi | x′ = [x′pi] ∈ X′}, where
the objectives are the functions up, for p ∈ L \ pi. Formally:
Definition 6. Given x = [xpi] ∈ X′ ⊆ X, for any pi ∈ ΠL,
xpi is efficient on the set X′ if xpi ∈ PL\pi(X′). Moreover:
• x is efficient on X′ if x∅ is efficient on X′;
• x is perfectly efficient on X′ if xpi is efficient on X′ for
every pi ∈ ΠL.
We introduce three different solution concepts for our
SGs, which we refer to as Stackelberg correlated equilibria
(SCEs). They differ on the types of stability and efficiency
that they prescribe. Formally:
Definition 7. Given an SG (G,L, F ), x ∈ X is an:
• SCE if it is efficient on the set XS;
• SCE with perfect agreement (SCE-PA) if it is efficient on
the set XPS;
• SCE with perfect agreement and perfect efficiency
(SCE-PAPE) if it is perfectly efficient on the set XPS.
We denote withXSCE, XSCE-PA, andXSCE-PAPE the sets of
SCEs, SCE-PAs, and SCE-PAPEs, respectively.
Example 1. Consider the SG in Figure 1, where L = {1, 2}
and F = ∅. Let x = [xpi] be such that x∅(s1,1, s2,1) = 1,
x{2}(s1,5, s2,1) = 1, and xpi(s1,1, s2,2) = 1 for all the other
pi ∈ ΠL. Clearly, xpi ∈ X CEpi for all pi ∈ ΠL. Moreover, being
x∅ stable and Pareto optimal, x is an SCE. Observe that, if
player 2 performs OPT-OUT, x prescribes an irrational be-
havior to player 1, as u1(x{2}) = 0, while she gets 1 by
doing OPT-OUT. Thus, x is not perfectly stable, as playing
OPT-IN must be optimal at any decision point of the agree-
ment stage. For instance, x′ = [x′pi] with x
′
∅(s1,2, s2,1) = 1
and x′pi(s1,3, s2,2) = 1 for every other pi ∈ ΠL is an SCE-
PA. However, notice that x′ is not an SCE-PAPE since x′{2}
does not maximize player 1’s utility. Instead, x′′ = [x′′pi] with
x′′∅(s1,4, s2,1) = 1, x
′′
{2}(s1,3, s2,1), and x
′′
pi(s1,4, s2,2) = 1
for all the other pi ∈ ΠL is an SCE-PAPE.
4 On the Existence of SCEs
We investigate the existence of our solution concepts in gen-
eral SGs. We show that SCEs and SCE-PAs always exist,
while we provide an SG where there is no SCE-PAPE.
The fundamental step for proving our existence results
(Theorem 1) is to show that (i) XS and XPS are polytopes,
s2,1 s2,2
s1,1 5, 0 1, 2
s1,2 4, 1 1, 2
s1,3 2, 1 1, 1
s1,4 3, 2 1, 3
s1,5 0, 0 0, 0
1
2
x∅
OPT-IN
1
x{2}
OPT-IN
x{2,1}
OPT-OUT
OPT-OUT
OPT-IN 2
x{1}
OPT-IN
x{1,2}
OPT-OUT
OPT-OUT
Figure 1: Left: Example of two-player normal-form SG with L =
{1, 2}. Right: Sequential game representing its agreement stage.
s2,1 s2,2
s1,1 0, 2, 0 2, 0, 0
s1,2 0, 2, 0 1, 2, 1
s3,1
s2,1 s2,2
s1,1 0, 2, 0 2, 1, 1
s1,2 0, 2, 0 0, 0, 0
s3,2
s2,1 s2,2
s1,1 0, 0, 1 0, 0, 1
s1,2 0, 0, 1 0, 0, 1
s3,3
Table 1: Three-player normal-form SG with no SCE-PAPE (players
1, 2, and 3 select rows, columns, and matrices, respectively).
and (ii) they are non-empty. The latter point is a direct conse-
quence of the fact that all vectors x = [xpi] ∈ X with xpi = x
for some CE x ∈ X CE are perfectly stable.
Theorem 1. Every SG admits an SCE and an SCE-PA.
Proposition 1. There are SGs with no SCE-PAPE.
Proof sketch. Consider the SG in Table 1, where L =
{1, 2, 3} and F = ∅. Any x = [xpi] ∈ XSCE-PAPE must
be such that, for every xpi with player 3 in pi, u3(xpi) = 1
(as player 3 always gets 1 by deviating to s3,3). Given the
definition of stability and player 3’s incentive constraints,
x{1,2} and x{2,1} must always recommend s3,3 to player 3.
Moreover, by stability and efficiency, x{1} must always rec-
ommend (s1,1, s2,2, s3,2), where player 1 gets a utility of 2.
Similarly, x{2} must always recommend (s1,2, s2,2, s3,1) and,
thus, player 2 receives a utility of 2. Thus, for stability, x∅
must satisfy u1(x∅), u2(x∅) ≥ 2, which is impossible.
As a result, in the rest of this work we focus on SCEs and
SCE-PAs. We remark that the non-existence of SCE-PAPEs
implies that, under the requirements of perfect stability and
perfect efficiency, there cannot be an agreement involving all
the leaders. This does not rule out the possibility that some
subsets of leaders can still reach an agreement. However,
these cases are much more involved, as the actual group of
leaders reaching an agreement inevitably depends on the rules
of the protocol implemented in the agreement stage.
5 SCEs and Other Solution Concepts
We show that the optimal correlated strategies to commit to
introduced by Conitzer and Korzhyk [2011] are a special case
of SCEs. Intuitively, in single-leader SGs, efficiency is equiv-
alent to the maximization of leader’s utility, while stability
does not enforce additional constraints on the commitment.
Theorem 2. Given an SG (G, {1}, N \{1}), it holdsXSCE =
XSCE-PA = XSCE-PAPE and, given some x = [xpi] ∈ XSCE,
x∅ is an optimal correlated strategy to commit to.
Proof sketch. Since the SG has only one leader (player 1),
XS = XPS, and, thus, XSCE = XSCE-PA. For the same rea-
sons, XSCE-PA = XSCE-PAPE. Moreover, Pareto optimality is
the same as maximizing the leader’s utility function u1. Let
x = [xpi] ∈ XSCE and assume, by contradiction, that x∅ is
not an optimal correlated strategy to commit to. Then, there
would be another xˆ ∈ X CEN\{1} such that u1(xˆ) ≥ u1(x∅).
However, replacing x∅ with xˆ in x would give us another
xˆ ∈ XS, contradicting the efficiency of x.
Given the relation between optimal correlated strategies to
commit to and SEs in single-leader single-follower SGs:
Corollary 2.1. Given an SG (G, {1}, {2}), any x = [xpi] ∈
XSCE is such that u1(x∅) is the leader’s utility in an SE.
For the relationships of SCEs with other non-Stackelberg
solution concepts, we refer the reader to Appendix A.
6 Computational Complexity of SCEs
We study the computational complexity of SCEs and SCE-
PAs in general SGs. We distinguish between the problem of
finding an equilibrium and that of computing an optimal equi-
librium, i.e., one maximizing a specific given linear function
of leaders’ utilities, such as the leader’s social welfare. We
introduce the following formal definitions (problems f-SCE-
PA and o-SCE-PA(λ) are defined analogously for SCE-PAs).
Definition 8 (f-SCE). Given an SG (G,L, F ), find an SCE.
Definition 9 (o-SCE(λ)). Given an SG (G,L, F ) and λ =
[λp] ∈ [0, 1]|L|, find an SCE x = [xpi] ∈ XSCE maximizing
the objective function fλ =
∑
p∈L
∑
s∈S λpup(s)x∅(s).
Let us remark that, in general, the size of a vector x ∈ X
is factorial in the number of players. Thus, in the following,
we assume that there is some compact representation for x. 6
We establish a tight connection between our problems and
an auxiliary one, which is a generalization of the problem of
finding an optimal CE. In the rest of the section, we assume to
have access to an oracle solving this auxiliary problem, which
we call stability oracle. In Section 7, we then investigate for
which games the oracle can be efficiently implemented.
Definition 10. A stability oracle O(G, c, L, {xp}p∈L′⊆L) is
an algorithm that, given a finite game G, a coefficients vector
c = [cp] ∈ [−1, 1]n, a set of leaders L ⊆ N , and a collection
of correlated distributions xp ∈ X for p ∈ L′ ⊆ L, returns an
x ∈ X CEN\L maximizing
∑
p∈N
∑
s∈S cpup(s)x(s) subject to
the stability constraints, i.e., up(x) ≥ up(xp) for all p ∈ L′. 7
In the following, we are interested in games where the sta-
bility oracle runs in polynomial time. Thus, we assume that
O always returns a correlated distribution with size polyno-
mial in the size of the game. 8 We also consider the decision
form of the stability oracle, which reads as follows:
6As we see next, for all our positive results we can safely as-
sume that there is a compact representation for x ∈ X (e.g., x only
requires a polynomial number of polynomially-sized distributions).
7Note that, given a finite game G, O(G, c,∅,∅) returns an op-
timal CE x ∈ X CE for the objective function defined by c ∈ [0, 1]n.
8Indeed, this assumption is not restrictive, as all the games we
study in Section 7 admit a poly-time oracle O with this property.
Definition 11. The decision form of a stability oracleO is an
algorithmOD(x, L, {xp}p∈L′⊆L) that, given x ∈ X , L ⊆ N ,
and xp ∈ X for p ∈ L′ ⊆ L, answers YES if x ∈ X CEN\L and
x satisfies the stability constraints, and NO otherwise.
In the following, given L ⊆ N and λ = [λp] ∈ [0, 1]|L|,
we let cλ = [cλ,p] ∈ [0, 1]n be such that cλ,p = λp if p ∈ L,
while cλ,p = 0 if not. Moreover, given p ∈ N , we let cp =
[cp,q] ∈ [0, 1]n be such that cp,p = −1 and cp,q = 0 for all
q ∈ N \ {p}. Note that cλ is the coefficients vector of the
objective fλ, while cp corresponds to minimizing up.
6.1 Computing SCEs
We show that, in games admitting a polynomial-time sta-
bility oracle, an optimal SCE can be computed in polyno-
mial time. Intuitively, o-SCE(λ) is solved by x = [xpi]
computed as: x{p} = O(G, cp, L \ {p},∅) for p ∈ L,
x∅ = O(G, cλ, L, {x{p}}p∈L), and xpi = O(G, cλ,∅,∅)
for every other ordered subset pi ∈ ΠL. Formally:
Theorem 3. Given an SG (G,L, F ) and λ ∈ [0, 1]|L|, o-
SCE(λ) can be solved with |L|+ 2 queries to an oracle O.
Corollary 3.1. Given an SG (G,L, F ), if there is a poly-time
oracle O, then o-SCE(λ) can be solved in polynomial time.
6.2 Computing SCE-PAs
First, we provide a positive result: one can find an SCE-PA
with polynomially many invocations to a stability oracle. It is
sufficient to compute x = [xpi] where x{p} = O(G, cp,∅,∅)
for p ∈ L and x∅ = O(G, cλ, L, {x{p}}p∈L). Thus:
Theorem 4. Given an SG (G,L, F ), f-SCE-PA can be
solved with |L|+ 1 queries to an oracle O.
Corollary 4.1. Given an SG (G,L, F ), if there is a poly-time
oracle O, then f-SCE-PA can be solved in polynomial time.
Now, we switch to the problem of computing an optimal
SCE-PA, showing that it cannot be solved efficiently, even
with access to a polynomial-time stability oracle. Specif-
ically, we prove a stronger negative result: even the easier
problem of verifying the perfect stability of a given x ∈ X
is computationally intractable. Our statement is based on
a reduction from the coNP-complete problem of deciding
whether a given formula in disjunctive normal form (DNF)
is a tautology or not [Arora and Barak, 2009].
Theorem 5. Given an SG (G,L, F ) and x ∈ X, verifying
whether x ∈ or 6∈ XPS is not in P unless NP = coNP, even
with access to a polynomial-time decision-form oracle OD.
Proof sketch. Given a formula Φ in DNF, we construct an SG
(G,L, F ) involving a leader pv for each variable v ∈ V and a
single follower pf . Each pv has two actions, sT and sF, which
define the truth value of v. As a result, any s ∈ S corresponds
to a truth assignment τs defined by leaders’ strategies. The
follower has a strategy sv for each variable v ∈ V . Table 2
reports the leaders’ utilities (the follower always gets 0). We
build x = [xpi] ∈ X with x∅(s) = 1 for some s ∈ S such
that spv = sT for all v ∈ V . Furthermore, for every v ∈ V
and pi ∈ ΠL\{pv}, we let xpipv (s) = 1 for s ∈ S with sp = sF
for all p ∈ pipv , sp = sT for all p ∈ L \ pipv , and spf = sv .
Φ(τs) = T Φ(τs) = F
spf = sv spf 6= sv ∃v : spv = sF ∀v : spv = sT
sT 0 #F(τs) |V | −1
sF #F(τs)− 1 |V | |V | 0
Table 2: Leader pv’s (v ∈ V ) utilities in the SG for the reduction of
Theorem 5. On rows, there are pv’s strategies sT and sF, whereas,
on columns, we report the four possible cases for s ∈ S. #F(τs)
denotes the number of variables set to false by τs.
If. Suppose Φ is a tautology. For every pi ∈ ΠL, xpi rec-
ommends all the leaders in pi to play sF. Note that, for every
v ∈ V and pi ∈ ΠL\{pv}, upv (xpi) = #F(τs) = |pi|, while, if
pv decides to OPT-OUT, she is recommended to play sF (one
more variable is set to false) and, being spf = sv , she gets
the same utility. As a result, all distributions xpi are stable.
Only if. Suppose Φ is not a tautology. Let s ∈ S be such
that Φ(τs) = F. If spv = sT for every v ∈ V , then x∅ is not
stable as the leaders would OPT-OUT (getting at least 0 >
−1). Otherwise, there exists s′ ∈ S such that Φ(τs′) = T
and xpi(s′) = 1, xpipv (s) = 1 for some v ∈ V , pi ∈ ΠL\{pv}.
Then, upv (xpi) = #F(τ
s′) = |pi| and upv (xpipv ) = |V | >|pi|. Thus, xpi is not stable, as leader pv would OPT-OUT.
As a byproduct of Theorem 3 we have that, when look-
ing for optimal SCEs, one can restrict the attention to those
x ∈ X admitting a representation whose size is polynomial
in the size of the game. For Theorem 4, the same holds when
searching for an SCE-PA. However, Theorem 5 implies that
optimal SCE-PAs require an exponential number of different
distributions. Moreover, even when x ∈ X can be easily rep-
resented in a compact form (as in the proof of Theorem 5), we
cannot check in polynomial time whether x ∈ XPS or not.
This poses a new intriguing question: can we restrict the
attention to x ∈ X whose size is less than factorial in the
number of players? We show that the answer is positive. It
is sufficient to consider x ∈ X whose size is exponential in
the number of players, as only the unordered set of defecting
leaders and the last of them who decided to OPT-OUT matter.
Theorem 6. Given an SG (G,L, F ) and x = [xpi] ∈ XPS,
there is an x′ = [x′pi] ∈ XPS s.t. x′∅ = x∅ and x′pip = x′pi′p
for every p ∈ L and pi, pi′ ∈ ΠL\{p} defining the same set.
Theorem 6 allows us to reduce the number of queries to a
stability oracle that are necessary to find an optimal SCE-PA.
Theorem 7. Given an SG (G,L, F ) and λ ∈ [0, 1]|L|, o-
SCE-PA(λ) can be solved with |L|2|L|−1 + 1 queries to O.
Finally, we can provide an example showing that Theo-
rem 7 is tight, which leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Solving o-SCE-PA(λ) requires to take into
account the last player who performed OPT-OUT, while fo-
cusing only on the set of defecting leaders is not sufficient.
9We remark that, for normal-form games, a polynomial-time sta-
bility oracle O can be implemented by using a variation of the LP
for finding optimal CEs [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008].
7 Stability Oracle for Compact Games
We study which classes of games admit a polynomial-time
stability oracle O, focusing on those with polynomial type. 9
In this section, we only provide our main final result; a de-
tailed description of all the ancillary results is in Appendix E.
Inspired by the classical approaches for finding CEs in
games with polynomial type [Papadimitriou and Roughgar-
den, 2008; Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2011; Jiang and Leyton-
Brown, 2015], we solve O(G, c, L, {xp}p∈L′⊆L) in polyno-
mial time using the ellipsoid method. This requires that a suit-
ably defined separation problem (Sep(z, t)) can be computed
in polynomial time. Our main result is that Sep(z, t) can
be reduced to the weighted deviation-adjusted social welfare
problem (w-DaSW(y, v, t)) introduced by Jiang and Leyton-
Brown [2011] for finding an optimal (according to some lin-
ear function of players’ utilities) CE. This establishes a strict
connection between the problem solved by our stability oracle
and that of computing optimal CEs. As a consequence, given
the results of Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2011],O can be com-
puted in polynomial time for all the compact games where
finding an optimal CE is computationally tractable. Thus:
Theorem 8. The following games admit a polynomial-time
stability oracleO: anonymous games, symmetric games, and
bounded-treewidth graphical and polymatrix games.
Finally, our results also imply that the polynomial-time sta-
bility oracle O always outputs a polynomially-sized corre-
lated distribution (see Corollary 11.1 in Appendix E).
8 Discussion
This paper introduces a new way to apply the Stackelberg
paradigm to any (underlying) finite game. Differently from
previous works, our approach deals with scenarios involv-
ing multiple leaders by introducing a preliminary agreement
stage in which each leader can decide whether to be a leader
or become a follower. We introduce and study three natural
solution concepts that differ depending on the properties that
they require on the agreement stage (others, e.g., requiring
stability and perfect efficiency, will be explored in future).
Our equilibria generalize the optimal correlated strategies
to commit to introduced by Conitzer and Korzhyk [2011] for
single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg games. At the same
time, they also provide a significant advancement over the
multi-leader solution concepts introduced in the security con-
text (see, e.g., [Gan et al., 2018]). First, correlated-strategy
commitments are more natural than leaders’ strategies sat-
isfying some Nash-like constraints. Second, our equilibria
are funded on strong game-theoretic groundings, as they are
guaranteed to exist independently of the game structure. Last
but not least our solutions apply to general games.
Finally, our computational findings exploit a general
framework relying on a game-independent stability oracle.
Thus, our positive results can be extended to other game
classes by simply designing polynomial-time oracles.
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A SCEs and non-Stackelberg Correlation
We analyze how our solution concepts relate to other non-
Stackelberg solutions involving correlation. Specifically, we
focus on CEs (see Section 2 for a formal definition) and their
coarse variant, which we define in the following.
The coarse CE weakens the CE by only enforcing protec-
tion against a priori defections, i.e., before the recommen-
dations are revealed to the players [Moulin and Vial, 1978].
Formally, x ∈ X is a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) if,
for every player p ∈ N and strategy s′p ∈ Sp, the following
constraint holds:∑
s∈S
x(s)
(
up(s)− up(s′p, s−p)
) ≥ 0. (2)
We denote with X CCE the set of CCEs of the game.
In our analysis, we compare CEs and CCEs with the cor-
related distributions x∅ resulting from our solution concepts
in general SGs. Given an SG (G,L, F ), we define X S ⊆ X
and X PS ⊆ X as the sets of x∅ such that x = [xpi] ∈ XS
and x ∈ XPS, respectively. Our goal is to investigate the rela-
tionships involving the sets X S and X PS with the sets of CEs
and CCEs of the underlying gameG, namelyX CE andX CCE.
Figure 2 depicts these relationships.
XCCE
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Figure 2: Relations among X S, X PS, X CE, X CCE, X S-NF, X PS-NF.
Let us remark that the relations X CE ⊆ X CCE, X CE ⊆
X PS, and X PS ⊆ X S hold by definition, while it is easy to
show that X CE ⊆ X PS (see the proof of Theorem 1).
First, we look at the connection between (perfectly) sta-
ble distributions and CCEs. Given the relation between
SEs and SCEs (see Corollary 2.1) in single-leader single-
follower SGs, the following result holds as a direct conse-
quence of [Von Stengel and Zamir, 2010, Remark 13].
Proposition 3. There are SGs where X CCE * X S.
Moreover, not all perfectly stable distributions are CCEs.
Proposition 4. There are SGs where X PS * X CCE.
Proof. Consider the SG in Table 3 (Left), where L = {1, 2}
and F = ∅. Since s1,1 and s2,1 are strictly dominated,
there is a unique CCE x ∈ X CCE with x(s1,2, s2,2) = 1.
Let x = [xpi] ∈ X be such that x∅(s1,1, s2,1) = 1 and
xpi(s1,2, s2,2) = 1 for all pi 6= ∅ ∈ ΠL. Notice that each xpi
with pi 6= ∅ satisfies the incentive constraints of Eq. (1) for
every player, and, thus, xpi ∈ X CEpi . Moreover, for each leader
p ∈ L, up(x∅) = 2 and up(xpi) = 1 for all pi ∈ ΠL \ {∅}.
Thus, each xpi is stable and x ∈ XPS.
s2,1 s2,2
s1,1 2, 2 0, 3
s1,2 3, 0 1, 1
s2,1 s2,2 s2,3 s2,4
s1,1 0, 0 −2, 4 1,−8 1,−2
s1,2 1,−8 0, 0 −2, 4 1,−2
s1,3 −2, 4 1,−8 0, 0 1,−2
Table 3: Left: Two-player normal-form SG where X PS * X CCE.
Right: Two-player normal-form SG where X CCE * X PS-NF.
Next, we analyze the relationships with the sets X S-NF and
X PS-NF, which are defined as X S and X PS, but for the SG
(G,N,∅) where each player is a leader. Our goal is to study
the impact of players’ roles in SGs having the same underly-
ing finite game. The following result shows that enlarging the
set of leaders can only introduce new stable distributions.
Theorem 9. X S ⊆ X S-NF and X PS ⊆ X PS-NF.
Proof. We only prove the result for X PS, as similar argu-
ments hold for X S. Given any SG (G,L, F ), for every per-
fectly stable x = [xpi] ∈ XPS of (G,L, F ), we show that
there exists a perfectly stable x′ = [x′pi] ∈ XPS of (G,N,∅),
such that x∅ = x′∅. Let us define x
′
pi = xpi∩L, for all pi ∈
ΠN . Clearly, it holds x′pi ∈ X CEpi , as x′pi ∈ X CE(pi∩L)∪F ⊆ X CEpi .
For every player p ∈ L and pi ∈ ΠN such that p /∈ pi, we
have up(x′pi) = up(xpi∩L) and up(x
′
pip) = up(xpip∩L). Thus,
given that x ∈ XPS, x′ satisfies the stability constraints for
the players in L. Now, in order to show that x′ ∈ XPS, it is
sufficient to prove that players in F do not have an incentive
to OPT-OUT in (G,N,∅). This is the case as, for p ∈ F and
pi ∈ ΠN with p /∈ pi, we have x′pip = x′pi .
Furthermore, we can also provide examples showing that:
Proposition 5. There are SGs where X PS-NF * X S.
Proof. Consider the SG in Table 3 (Left), where L = {1}
and F = {2}. There is an x = [xpi] ∈ XPS-NF of (G,N,∅)
in which x∅(s1,1, s2,1) = 1 (see the proof of Proposition 4).
Let x′ = [x′pi] ∈ XS of (G,L, F ). Since x′∅ ∈ X CE{2} and s2,1
is strictly dominated, it must be x′∅(s1,1, s2,1) = 0.
Proposition 6. There are SGs where X CCE * X PS-NF.
Proof. Consider the SG in Table 3 (Right), where L = N =
{1, 2}. There is a CCE x ∈ X CCE with x(s1,1, s2,1) =
x(s1,2, s2,2) = x(s1,3, s2,3) =
1
3 . We show that there is no
x = [xpi] ∈ XPS with x∅ = x. By contradiction, assume
there exists such x. Given that u1(x∅) = 0, it should be the
case that u1(x{1}) ≤ 0, by stability of x∅. Take the incen-
tive constraints of player 1 (Eq. (1)). Since there must be no
incentive to deviate from s1,1 to s1,2, it holds
x{1}(s1,1, s2,3) ≥ 1
3
x{1}(s1,1, s2,1) +
2
3
x{1}(s1,1, s2,2).
Similar conditions also hold for the deviation from s1,2 to s1,3
and that from s1,3 to s1,1. Thus, we can write:
x{1}(s1,2, s2,1) ≥ 1
3
x{1}(s1,2, s2,2) +
2
3
x{1}(s1,2, s2,3),
x{1}(s1,3, s2,2) ≥ 1
3
x{1}(s1,3, s2,3) +
2
3
x{1}(s1,3, s2,1).
As a result, we can conclude that, if x{1} only recommends
player 2 to play s2,1, s2,2, and s2,3, then u2(x{1}) < −2.
However, if player 2 decides to OPT-OUT, then she would
get at least −2, as x{1,2} ∈ X CE and player 2 is guaranteed
to get −2 by playing s2,4. Thus, being x{1} stable, it must be
the case that player 2 is always recommended to play s2,4 in
x{1}. Thus, u1(x{1}) = 1, which is a contradiction.
Finally, we prove that the stable distributions for the SG
without followers encompass those defining CCEs.
Theorem 10. X CCE ⊆ X S-NF.
Proof. Let x ∈ X CCE be a CCE of a given finite game G.
We prove that the SG (G,N,∅) admits a stable distribution
x = [xpi] ∈ XS with x∅ = x. In order to do so, for every
leader p ∈ N , we let x{p} be such that up(x{p}) ≤ up(x),
as shown in the following. Let us fix a player p ∈ N and let
sˆp ∈ Sp be such that, for every s′p ∈ Sp:∑
s∈S
x(s)
(
up(sˆp, s−p)− up(s′p, s−p)
) ≥ 0, (3)
i.e., sˆp is the best player p’s strategy against the correlated
distribution x. Given that x ∈ X CCE:∑
s∈S
x(s) (up(s)− up(sˆp, s−p)) ≥ 0. (4)
We define x{p} as follows:
• x{p}(sˆp, s−p) =
∑
sp∈Sp x(sp, s−p) ∀s−p ∈ S−p;
• x{p}(sp, s−p) = 0 ∀sp 6= sˆp ∈ Sp, s−p ∈ S−p.
Given how x{p} is defined and Eq. (3), we have that the incen-
tive constraints of player p (Eq. (1)) are satisfied, and, thus,
x{p} ∈ X CE{p}. Moreover, Eq. (4) implies that up(x{p}) ≤
up(x), which concludes the proof.
Observe that, when one looks for equilibria maximizing a
linear function of leaders’ utilities (e.g., the leaders’ social
welfare), larger sets result in better solutions. 10 Moreover,
we can provide examples where the difference in terms of
leaders’ social welfare between two solution concepts can be
arbitrarily large. For instance, the following holds. 11
Proposition 7. There are SGs (G,L, F ) with leaders’ social
welfare in SCE-PAs arbitrarily larger than in any CE of G.
Proof. Consider the SG in Table 4, where L = {1, 2} and
F = ∅. Since strategies s1,1 and s2,1 are strictly dom-
inated, the only CE is x ∈ X CE with x(s1,2, s2,2) = 1.
Let x = [xpi] ∈ X be such that x∅(s1,1, s2,1) = 1 and
xpi(s1,2, s2,2) = 1 for all pi 6= ∅ ∈ ΠL. It is easy to check
that x ∈ XSCE-PA. Moreover, the social welfare of the CE is
2, while the social welfare of the SCE-PA is 2k.
10Let us remark that, since XS and XPS are polytopes (see
Lemma 1 in Appendix B), maximizing a linear function of leaders’
utilities over the sets XS and XPS also provides Pareto optimality,
and, thus, efficiency over the corresponding set.
11Similar results hold for the other pairs of solution concepts.
s2,1 s2,2
s1,1 k, k 0, k + 1
s1,2 k + 1, 0 1, 1
Table 4: Two-player normal-form SG (with k > 0) where the lead-
ers’ social welfare of an SCE-PA is arbitrary larger than in any CE.
B Omitted Proofs for Section 4
Lemma 1. The sets XS and XPS are polytopes.
Proof. X ⊆ R|ΠL|·|S| is the set of vectors x = [xpi] such that
xpi ∈ X CEpi∪F for all pi ∈ ΠL. Each X CEpi∪F is defined by the
linear constraints of Eq. (1), thus X is a polytope. Moreover,
if x ∈ XPS ⊆ X, xpi is stable for all pi ∈ ΠL, i.e., up(xpi) ≥
up(xpip) for all p ∈ L\pi. Thus, being these constraints linear,
XPS is a polytope. A similar argument holds for XS.
Theorem 1. Every SG admits an SCE and an SCE-PA.
Proof. Given an SG (G,L, F ), let x ∈ X CE and x = [xpi] ∈
X be such that xpi = x for all pi ∈ ΠL. We prove that x ∈
XPS. First, for each pi ∈ ΠL, xpi ∈ X CEpi∪F , since X CE ⊆
X CEpi∪F . Moreover, each xpi is stable, since up(xpi) = up(xpip)
for all p ∈ L \ pi. This shows that XPS 6= ∅. Finally, being
XPS a polytope by Lemma 1, there exists x = [xpi] ∈ XPS
such that x∅ ∈ PL(XPS). Thus, XSCE-PA 6= ∅. A similar
reasoning holds for the sets XS and XSCE.
Proposition 1. There are SGs with no SCE-PAPE.
Proof. Consider the SG in Table 1, where L = {1, 2, 3}
and F = ∅. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists
x = [xpi] ∈ XSCE-PAPE. First, for every xpi with player 3
in pi, u3(xpi) = 1 (otherwise xpi /∈ X CEpi∪F , as player 3 always
gets 1 by deviating to s3,3). Let us consider the sequences of
OPT-OUT defined by the ordered subsets {1, 2} and {2, 1}.
Given that the definition of stability requires u3(x{1,2}) ≥
u3(x{1,2,3}) = 1 and u3(x{2,1}) ≥ u3(x{2,1,3}) = 1,
we have that x{1,2} and x{2,1} must place strictly posi-
tive probability only on strategy profiles (s1,2, s2,2, s3,1),
(s1,1, s2,2, s3,2), and those recommending s3,3 to player 3.
Moreover, player 1 cannot be told to play s1,2, as she would
have an incentive to deviate to s1,1. The same holds for player
2 and strategy s2,2. As a result, x{1,2} and x{2,1} must always
recommend s3,3 to player 3. Now, let us take the sequence of
OPT-OUT defined by {1}. By stability of x{1}, it must hold
u3(x{1}) ≥ u3(x{1,3}) = 1 and u2(x{1}) ≥ u2(x{1,2}) = 0.
Hence, given x{1} ∈ X CE{1}, we can conclude that, in order
to satisfy x{1} ∈ PL\{1}(XPS), x{1} must always recom-
mend the strategy profile (s1,1, s2,2, s3,2), where player 1 gets
a utility of 2. Similarly, for the sequence defined by {2}, x{2}
must always recommend (s1,2, s2,2, s3,1) and, thus, player 2
receives a utility of 2. Thus, for stability, x∅ must satisfy
u1(x∅), u2(x∅) ≥ 2, which is clearly impossible.
C Omitted Proofs for Section 5
Theorem 2. Given an SG (G, {1}, N \{1}), it holdsXSCE =
XSCE-PA = XSCE-PAPE and, given some x = [xpi] ∈ XSCE,
x∅ is an optimal correlated strategy to commit to.
Proof. Since the SG has only one leader (player 1), stability
and perfect stability are equivalent, and, thus, XS = XPS.
As a result, XSCE = XSCE-PA. Moreover, for the same rea-
sons, also efficiency and perfect efficiency are equivalent, and
XSCE-PA = XSCE-PAPE. Note that requiring Pareto optimal-
ity is the same as maximizing the leader’s utility function u1.
Let x = [xpi] ∈ XSCE and assume, by contradiction, that
x∅ is not an optimal correlated strategy to commit to. This
would imply that there exists another xˆ ∈ X CEN\{1} such that
u1(xˆ) ≥ u1(x∅). However, replacing x∅ with xˆ in x would
give us another xˆ ∈ XS (stability constraints are trivially sat-
isfied). This would contradict the efficiency of x.
D Omitted Proofs for Section 6
Theorem 3. Given an SG (G,L, F ) and λ ∈ [0, 1]|L|, o-
SCE(λ) can be solved with |L|+ 2 queries to an oracle O.
Proof. We build an x = [xpi] ∈ XSCE that maximizes fλ by
invoking a stability oracleO multiple times. For every p ∈ L,
we define x{p} = O(G, cp, L \ {p},∅). Moreover, we let
x∅ = O(G, cλ, L, {x{p}}p∈L) and xpi = O(G, cλ,∅,∅) for
every pi ∈ ΠL with |pi| ≥ 2. Clearly, we need |L|+ 2 calls to
O. First, xpi ∈ X CEpi∪F for every pi ∈ ΠL, by definition of O.
For the same reason, we have up(x∅) ≥ up(x{p}) for all p ∈
L. Thus, we can conclude that x ∈ XS. Let fλ be the value of
the objective for x. We show that fλ is maximized over XS.
Being fλ a linear combination of leader’s utility functions,
we immediately get that x∅ ∈ PL(XS), and x ∈ XSCE. By
contradiction, suppose that there exists an x′ = [x′pi] ∈ XS
with objective function value f ′λ > fλ. This implies that there
exists a leader p ∈ L with up(x′{p}) < up(x{p}), otherwise
the solution x∅ returned by O(G, cλ, L, {x{p}}p∈L) would
not be optimal. This is a contradiction, since x{p} minimizes
player p’s utility on the set X CE{p}∪F , and x′{p} ∈ X CE{p}∪F .
Theorem 4. Given an SG (G,L, F ), f-SCE-PA can be
solved with |L|+ 1 queries to an oracle O.
Proof. Using O, we construct an x ∈ XSCE-PA. Let x{p} =
O(G, cp,∅,∅), i.e., x{p} is a CE that minimizes player p’s
utility. Moreover, we define x∅ = O(G, cλ, L, {x{p}}p∈L)
for some λ ∈ (0, 1]|L|. By setting, for every leader p ∈ L,
xpi = x{p} for all pi ∈ ΠL where p is the first to OPT-OUT, we
have x ∈ XPS. Clearly, we only require |L|+ 1 queries toO.
Now, we prove that x∅ ∈ PL(XPS), and, thus, x ∈ XSCE-PA.
By contradiction, suppose that it is not the case, i.e., there
exists an x′ = [x′pi] ∈ XPS with up(x′∅) ≥ up(x∅) for all
p ∈ L and uq(x′∅) > uq(x∅) for some leader q ∈ L. By
stability of x∅, we have that up(x′∅) ≥ up(x∅) ≥ up(x{p})
for every p ∈ L. Thus, x′∅ satisfies up(x′∅) ≥ up(x{p}) for
every leader p ∈ L (stability), and∑
p∈N
∑
s∈S
cλ,pup(s)x
′
∅(s) >
∑
p∈N
∑
s∈S
cλ,pup(s)x∅(s),
which implies that x′∅ verifies the constraints for a solution toO(G, cλ, L, {x{p}}p∈L), while providing an objective grater
than that of x∅. This contradicts the correctness of O.
Theorem 5. Given an SG (G,L, F ) and x ∈ X, verifying
whether x ∈ or 6∈ XPS is not in P unless NP = coNP, even
with access to a polynomial-time decision-form oracle OD.
Proof. Given a DNF formula Φ, we build an SG and an
x ∈ X such that x ∈ XPS if and only if Φ is a tautology.
Thus, if one could verify the perfect stability of x in poly-
nomial time, then there would be a polynomial-time check-
able certificate for the coNP-complete problem of determin-
ing whether a DNF formula is a tautology or not [Arora and
Barak, 2009]. This would imply NP = coNP. Moreover,
given how the SG is built, the result holds even if we get
access to a polynomial-time decision oracle OD.
Construction. Given a DNF formula Φ, let V denote the set
of variables appearing in Φ. We construct an SG (G,L, F )
involving a leader for each variable and a single follower,
i.e., L = {pv | v ∈ V } and F = {pf}. Moreover, we
let Spf = {sv | v ∈ V } be the set of follower’s strate-
gies, one per variable, while the leaders share the strategies
Spv = {sT, sF}, corresponding to truth values . As a result,
any strategy profile s ∈ S corresponds to a truth assignment
τs defined by leaders’ strategies. We write Φ(τs) = T if
τs satisfies Φ, while Φ(τs) = F otherwise. We also denote
with #F(τs) the number of false variables in τs. Table 2
reports the leaders’ utilities, while the follower’s one is al-
ways 0. Then, we build an x = [xpi] ∈ X with x∅(s) = 1
for some s ∈ S such that spv = sT for every v ∈ V .
Furthermore, for every v ∈ V and pi ∈ ΠL\{pv}, we let
xpipv (s) = 1 for s ∈ S with sp = sF for every p ∈ pipv ,
sp = sT for every p ∈ L \ pipv , and spf = sv . Let us re-
mark that our SG admits a polynomial-time decision oracle
OD(x, L, {xp}p∈L′⊆L), since it can be queried in polynomial
time only on polynomially-sized distributions.
If. We prove that, if Φ is a tautology, then x ∈ XPS. For
every pi ∈ ΠL, xpi recommends all the leaders in pi to play sF.
Moreover, being Φ a tautology, strategy sF (weakly) domi-
nates sT (as it is always the case that Φ(τs) = T). Thus,
xpi ∈ X CEpi∪F . Note that, for every v ∈ V and pi ∈ ΠL\{pv},
upv (xpi) = #F(τ
s) = |pi|, while, if p decides to OPT-OUT,
she is recommended to play sF and, being spf = sv , she gets
the same utility. As a result, all distributions xpi are stable.
Only if. We prove that, if Φ is not a tautology, then
x /∈ XPS. Let s ∈ S be such that φ(τs) = F. Two cases
are possible. If spv = sT for every v ∈ V , then x∅ is not
stable as the leaders would have an incentive to OPT-OUT
(since they get at least 0 > −1). If this is not the case, then
there exist s, s′ ∈ S such that Φ(τs) = T and Φ(τs′) = F,
where xpi(s) = 1 and xpipv (s
′) = 1 for some v ∈ V and
pi ∈ ΠL\{pv}. In this case, upv (xpi) = #F(τs) = |pi| and
upv (xpipv ) = |V | > |pi|. Thus, xpi is not stable, as leader pv
would have an incentive to OPT-OUT.
Corollary 7.1. Given an SG (G,L, F ) and x ∈ X, veri-
fying whether x ∈ X is an SCE-PA maximizing the social
welfare is not in P unless NP = coNP, even with access to a
polynomial-time decision-form oracle OD.
Proof. We can modify the proof of Theorem 5 so that, when
Φ is a tautology, x ∈ X is the only perfectly stable distribu-
tion maximizing the social welfare. In order to do this, it is
enough to add a leader with a single action and utility |V |2 if
spv = sT for all v ∈ V , while 0 otherwise.
Theorem 6. Given an SG (G,L, F ) and x = [xpi] ∈ XPS,
there is an x′ = [x′pi] ∈ XPS s.t. x′∅ = x∅ and x′pip = x′pi′p
for every p ∈ L and pi, pi′ ∈ ΠL\{p} defining the same set.
Proof. Let us take some x ∈ XPS. For every p ∈ L and
pi ∈ ΠL\{p}, we define x′pip = xpi′p where xpi′p minimizes
up(xpi′p) over all pi′ ∈ ΠL\{p} such that pi and pi′ define the
same set. Moreover, let x′∅ = x∅. Clearly, x
′
pi ∈ X CEpi∪F
for all pi ∈ ΠL (as each x′pi is set equal to an xpi′ such that
pi and pi′ correspond to the same set of leaders who per-
formed OPT-OUT). Moreover, it is easy to check that x′ is
perfectly stable, as follows. Let us consider some p ∈ L and
pi ∈ ΠL\{p}. By definition, for every q ∈ L \ pip, it holds
uq(x
′
pip) = uq(xpi′p), for some pi
′ ∈ ΠL\{p}. Moreover,
uq(xpi′p) ≥ uq(xpi′pq) by stability of x, and uq(xpi′pq) ≥
uq(x
′
pi′′pq) for some pi
′′ ∈ ΠL\{p}. Finally, by definition of
x′, we have that uq(x′pi′′pq) = uq(x
′
pipq), which shows that
uq(x
′
pip) ≥ uq(x′pipq). Since this holds for any p ∈ L and
pi ∈ ΠL\{p}, we conclude that x′ ∈ XPS.
Theorem 7. Given an SG (G,L, F ) and λ ∈ [0, 1]|L|, o-
SCE-PA(λ) can be solved with |L|2|L|−1 + 1 queries to O.
Proof. We build an x = [xpi] ∈ XSCE-PA that maximizes
fλ by using a stability oracle O. For every p ∈ L and
pi ∈ ΠL\{p} with pip = L, we let xpip = O(G, cp,∅,∅).
Otherwise, whenever pip 6= L, letting pi′ = pip, we set
xpi′ = O(G, cp, L \ pi′, {xpi′q}q∈L\pi′). Moreover, x∅ =
O(G, cλ, L, {x{p}}p∈L). Notice that xpip = xpi′p for every
p ∈ L and pi, pi′ ∈ ΠL\{p} with pi and pi′ defining the same
set. Thus, the number of queries to O is ∑|L|i=1 |L|(|L|−1i−1 ) +
1 = |L|2|L|−1 + 1. Clearly, by definition of O, all the in-
centive constraints of Eq. (1) are satisfied. Furthermore, it is
easy to check that xpi is stable for every pi ∈ ΠL. As a result,
we can conclude that x ∈ XPS. Now, we prove that x max-
imizes the objective fλ over the set XPS. This also proves
the efficiency of x, and, thus, x ∈ XSCE-PA. By contradic-
tion, suppose there exists another x′ = [x′pi] ∈ XSCE-PA with
objective value f ′λ > fλ. Three cases are possible:
• there exist p ∈ L and pi ∈ ΠL\{p} with pip = L such
that up(x′pip) < up(xpip);
• there exist p ∈ L and pi ∈ ΠL\{p} with pip 6= L such that
up(x
′
pip) < up(xpip) and, letting pi
′ = pip, uq(x′pi′q) ≥
uq(xpi′q) for all q ∈ L \ pi′;
• up(x′{p}) ≥ up(x{p}) for all p ∈ L.
All the three cases contradict the correctness of O.
Proposition 2. Solving o-SCE-PA(λ) requires to take into
account the last player who performed OPT-OUT, while fo-
cusing only on the set of defecting leaders is not sufficient.
s2,1 s2,2
s1,1 1, 2, 0 0, 1, 0
s1,2 1, 2, 0 0, 1, 0
s3,1
s2,1 s2,2
s1,1 2, 1, 0 2, 1, 0
s1,2 1, 0, 0 1, 0, 0
s3,2
s2,1 s2,2
s1,1 2, 2, 0 2, 2, 0
s1,2 2, 2, 0 0, 0, 10
s3,3
Table 5: Three-player normal-form SG showing that, when search-
ing for an optimal SCE-PA, it is necessary to consider the last leader
who performed OPT-OUT (players 1, 2, and 3 select rows, columns,
and matrices, respectively).
Proof. Consider the SG in Table 5, with L = {1, 2, 3}
and F = ∅. There exists an x = [xpi] ∈
XSCE-PA such that x∅(s1,2, s2,2, s3,3) = 1, and the
same holds for x{1}(s1,1, s2,2, s3,1), x{2,1}(s1,2, s2,2, s3,1),
x{2}(s1,2, s2,1, s3,2), and x{1,2}(s1,2, s2,1, s3,2). Moreover,
for every pi ∈ ΠL including player 3, xpi(s1,1, s2,1, s3,3) = 1.
Notice that xpi depends on the last player who decides to OPT-
OUT since x{1,2} 6= x{2,1}. We show that there is no x′ =
[x′pi] ∈ XSCE-PA where xpi does not depend on the last leader
to OPT-OUT and x′∅(s1,2, s2,2, s3,3) = 1. Assume, by con-
tradiction, that there exists such x′. If player 1 performs OPT-
OUT, she will get more than 0, unless only the strategy pro-
files (s1,2, s2,2, s3,3), (s1,1, s2,2, s3,1), and (s1,2, s2,2, s3,1)
are recommended by x′{1}. The other strategy profiles pro-
viding player 1 with a utility of 0 cannot be recommended,
otherwise incentive constraints of Eq. (1) are not satis-
fied. As a result, only strategy profiles (s1,1, s2,1, s3,2) and
(s1,1, s2,2, s3,2) are recommended in x′{1,2} (otherwise player
2 would have an incentive to OPT-OUT). Instead, consider
the case in which player 2 performs OPT-OUT. Since players
1 and 2 are symmetric, x′{2,1} can only recommend strategy
profiles (s1,1, s2,1, s3,1) and (s1,2, s2,1, s3,1). Thus, x′{2,1}
must be different from x′{1,2}, a contradiction.
E Omitted Proofs for Section 7
In this section, we provide a complete proof of Theorem 8.
For ease of presentation, we treat x ∈ X as an |S|-
dimensional vector. Moreover, given c = [cp] ∈ [−1, 1]n, let
w = [ws] ∈ R|S| be a vector with ws =
∑
p∈N cpup(s), and,
given a collection of correlated distributions {xp}p∈L′⊆L, let
bp =
∑
s∈S up(s)xp(s) for every p ∈ L′ ⊆ L.
The solutions returned by O(G, c, L, {xp}p∈L′\L) are the
optimal solutions to the following LP:
P :

max wTx
s.t. Ux ≥ 0
1Tx = 1, x ≥ 0,
where U is a matrix of dimensions C × |S| (with C =∑
p∈N\L |Sp|2 + |L|) encoding the coefficients of the incen-
tive constraints of Eq. (1) for the players in N \ L, and those
of the additional stability constraints, i.e., for every p ∈ L∑
s∈S
(up(s)− bp)x(s) ≥ 0.
We denote with Us the column of U corresponding to s ∈ S.
We can write the dual of problem P as:
D :

min t
s.t. UT z + w ≤ t1
z ≥ 0,
where z = [zpsp,s′p ; zp] ∈ RC is a vector of dual variables:
zpsp,s′p for all p ∈ N \L and sp, s′p ∈ Sp, and zp for all p ∈ L.
A separation problem forD asks whether a given pair (z, t)
is feasible, and if not, it calls for a hyperplane separating
(z, t) from the feasible set. Following Jiang and Leyton-
Brown [2011], we focus on a restricted form of separation,
requiring a violated constraint for infeasible points. Formally:
Definition 12 (Sep(z, t)). Given a pair (z, t) such that z ≥
0, determine if there exists an s ∈ S such that (Us)T z+ws >
t; if so output such an s.
Notice that, for every s ∈ S,
(Us)
T z =
∑
p∈N\L
∑
s′p∈Sp
zpsp,s′p
(
up(s)− up(s′p, s−p)
)
+
+
∑
p∈L
zp (up(s)− bp) .
The following holds:
Theorem 11. If Sep(z, t) can be solved in polynomial time,
then O can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Clearly, a polynomial-time algorithm for Sep(z, t)
can be used as separation oracle in the ellipsoid method, solv-
ing D in polynomial time. By duality, the optimal objective
for D is the value wTx of a solution x ∈ X for O. Since
we required that separating hyperplanes be constraints forD,
they can be used to compute such solution x.
Corollary 11.1. O returns a polynomially-sized x ∈ X .
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the fact that the
ellipsoid method, as applied in Theorem 11, generates a poly-
nomial number of violated constraints.
Now, we introduce some definitions from [Jiang and
Leyton-Brown, 2011]. Given a finite game G, we let y =
[ypsp,s′p ] ∈ RC
′
(with C ′ =
∑
p∈N |Sp|2) be a vector indexed
by p ∈ N and sp, s′p ∈ Sp. Moreover, we let v = [vp] ∈ Rn
be a vector indexed by p ∈ N .
Definition 13. Given a finite game G, a vector y ∈ RC′ such
that y ≥ 0, and a vector v ∈ Rn, the weighted deviation-
adjusted utility for player p ∈ N in s ∈ S is:
uˆps(y, v) = vpup(s) +
∑
s′p∈Sp
ypsp,s′p
(
up(s)− up(s′p, s−p)
)
,
and the weighted deviation-adjusted social welfare is
wˆs(y, v) =
∑
p∈N uˆ
p
s(y).
The following is the formal definition of weighted
deviation-adjusted social welfare problem. 12
12The version proposed by Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2011] adds
the additional constraints that vp ≥ 0 and∑p∈N vp = 1.
Definition 14 (w-DaSW(y, v, t)). Given a triplet (y, v, t)
such that y ≥ 0, determine if there exists an s ∈ S such
that wˆs(y, v) > t; if so output such an s.
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 12. Sep(z, t) reduces to w-DaSW(y, v, t).
Proof. Given (z, t) with z ≥ 0, asking (Us)T z + ws > t is
equivalent to asking∑
p∈N\L
∑
s′p∈Sp
ypsp,s′p
(
up(s)− up(s′p, s−p)
)
+
+
∑
p∈L
(cp + yp)up(s) +
∑
p∈N\L
cpup(s)−
∑
p∈L
ypbp > t.
In turn, this is equivalent to solving w-DaSW(yˆ, vˆ, tˆ) with:
• yˆpsp,s′p = 0 for all p ∈ L, sp, s′p ∈ Sp;
• yˆpsp,s′p = y
p
sp,s′p
for all p ∈ N \ L, sp, s′p ∈ Sp;
• tˆ = t+∑p∈L ypbp;
• vˆp = cp + yp for all p ∈ L;
• vˆp = cp for all p ∈ N \ L.
This concludes the proof.
In conclusion, the results in [Jiang and Leyton-Brown,
2011] together with Theorem 12 prove Theorem 8.
